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ABSTRACT 
The extent to which the behavior of people is consistent with game theoretic principles 
is investigated in a first price sealed bid auction environment Three linear rules of thwnb 
with increasing complexity are used as benchmarks to gauge the accuracy of the Constant 
Relative Risk Aversion Model (CRRAM). In addition, the CRRAM is tested against the 
relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis. 
Existing competitive bidding experiments cannot clearly distinguish between game 
theoretic models and linear markdown rules on an individual level. Within the parametric 
environments studied and reported in the experimental literature, game theoretic solutions 
are linear over the range of private values in which bid functions are estimated. In this 
study, agents drew values from nonuniform distributions. As a result, the game theoretic 
bidding behavior is nonlinear. 
Due to the nonlinearity, special econometric and nwnerical techniques are applied to 
solve the model and obtain the estimates. The CRRAM exhibits good fit of the data. The 
pseudo R2 is greater than 0.8 in 90 percent of the subjects. The CRRAM is more accurate 
than the Markdown Model (MM) and the Simple Ad hoc Model (SIMAM) but not as 
accurate as the Sophisticated Ad hoc Model (SOP AM). The data also suppons the 
relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis and suggests that substantial increases in 
the predictive power of game theoretic models can be gained from improvements in the 
theory of belief formation. 
Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price Auctions1 
Kay-Yut Chen Charles R. Plott 
1 Introduction. 
This paper investigates the extent to which the behavior in first price sealed bid 
auctions is consistent with the principles of rationality that form the foundations of game 
theory. Two different sets of rationality principles are of interest. The first set can be 
described as principles of maximizing behavior. Roughly speaking, it is as if people are
maximizing expected utility conditioned on their opponents' strategies and their beliefs 
about the state of the world. The second set of principles deals with belief formation and 
imply the rational expectations hypothesis which states that in equilibrium all of the beliefs 
of all of the agents are consistent with experience/reality. 
The research strategy is to conduct a series of first price auction experiments in an 
environment in which game theory predicts the existence of substantial nonlinearities in 
behavior. The predictions of game theory are then compared and tested against a family 
of alternative models. The class of linear decision rules (including piece wise linear 
decision rules) is used as alternate behavior models. 
The reasons to choose the class of linear decision rules as alternatives are three­
fold. Firstly, linear decision rules are often advocated as replacements for the rationality 
postulates of game theory because they are easy to implement and yet they still capture 
aspects of strategic considerations. Secondly, in a substantial amount of previous work 
linear decision rules were investigated and cannot be ruled out as the explanation of the 
data. Thus, a theory of linear rules of thumb competes with game theory as an explanation 
of existing data. The third reason reflects the fact that almost any decision rule can be 
described in terms of (perhaps piece wise) linear rules - at least within the limits of existing 
measurement technology. Sometimes this feature of the models is an extreme 
disadvantage since it implies that the models cannot be rejected when they become 
complex enough. However. in this study. this flexibility is used as a tool to identify the 
"degree" to which subjects exhibit rational behavior. 
1The financial suppon of the Nauonal Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics and Poliucal Science IS gratefully acknowledged. We also wish to thank John 
Ledyard. Mahmoud El-Gama!. John Kagel. Dan Levin. and James Walker for many helpful suggestions. 
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Previous experimental studies have focused on unifonnly distributed individual 
private values. This results in linear game theoretic models (except near a boundary of the 
support of private values) and enables researchers to track the models with ease. 
However, under these environments, it is hard to separate the predictions of game theory 
from the predictions of theories that hold that human decisions are governed by linear 
decision rules such as a constant percentage markdown. In contrast to previous studies, 
by applying numerical techniques and related econometric methods we are able to study 
basic game theory in an environment that was previously not so accessible and where the 
behavior predicted has substantial nonlinearities. Thus, we are able to separate the 
predictions of game theory from the predictions of theories that hold that human decisions 
are based on simple linear decision rules. 
In a seminal paper, Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988), the (asymmetric) constant 
relative risk averse model, referred to as CRRAM, was developed to explain experimental 
data from first price sealed bid auctions. In essence, Cox, Smith, and Walker (CSW) 
concluded that the data are very consistent with CRRAM (with the exception that 63% of 
the observed bidding functions have negative intercepts while CRRAM predicts zero 
intercepts). Thus, they demonstrated that CRRAM explains a long history of sealed bid 
auction experiments better than any other model. On the other hand, Kagel, Harstad, and 
Levin (1987) (KHL), compared ad hoc discounting rules to Nash equilibrium theories. 
They concluded from an analysis of the effects of the changes in public information on 
average revenue and on the directional changes in individual bids that the Risk Averse 
Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (RASNE) was the best of the theories. However, when the 
analysis was applied directly to individual bids alone, they could not statistically rule out a 
competing discounting model which assumes the bidders bid a discounted amount of their 
private value according to some rule of thumb. In the KHL study of the English auction 
and the second price auction, overbidding is observed in the latter but not the former. The 
overbidding is consistent with ad hoc reasoning but not consistent with game theoretic 
models. A third study by Guler, Plott, and Vuong (1987) (GPV) strongly rules out the 
model that people use general linear decision rules in favor of a modified game theoretic 
model. However, the data from the GPV study cannot easily be applied to an evaluation 
of CRRAM. 
These three patterns of results set the stage for our investigation. It is not 
conclusive that people are using optimal decisions rules when involved in competitive 
situations such as bidding. Could the CSW results be due to a general tendency for 
individuals to use linear decision rules° KHL cannot rule out the possibility that the 
answer is "yes." Furthermore. a controversy has blossomed about the econometric 
methodology used by CSW (see Kagel and Roth. 1991 and CSW, 1991). 
In our study, new data are obtained with the goal of resolving some of the issues 
mentioned above. We focus on how well models of rationality (game theoretic models) 
can explain the data in comparison to a number of ad hoc alternate models. A new 
method is provided to compare a Nash equilibrium model to linear bidding rules. In 
previous studies of the first price auction, experimenters used private values that were 
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drawn from a uniform distribution.2 Such an environment will result in linear Nash 
equilibrium bidding strategies over a substantial interval of possible values.3 Such Nash 
linear strategies, however, are consistent with a set of ad hoc linear rules. Because of this 
correspondence, investigators have resorted to the study of special independent variables 
(number of agents, auction rules, information structures) in order to separate models of 
Nash equilibrium and ad hoc linear behavior. In the experiments reported below, private 
values are drawn from non uniform distributions. Under CRRAM, the equilibrium bidding 
behavior is nonlinear and the non linearity depends on individual risk behavior and beliefs 
of aggregate risk behavior. 
In the first price auction, the rational expectation hypothesis states that all the 
agents in an auction have beliefs about the aggregate risk behavior of the other agents that 
reflect the truth. Under the CRRAM, risk behavior of an individual is characterized by a 
utility function that has one parameter called the risk parameter. The bidding function 
under the CRRAM of a player depends on his/her own risk parameter as well as his/her 
beliefs about the aggregate distribution of the risk parameter in the population. The 
beliefs about aggregate distribution of the risk parameter can be parameterized and 
estimated from bids of an individual. The individual risk parameter can also be estimated 
from bids of an individual. Thus, by testing whether all the individuals have the same 
beliefs and whether their beliefs are consistent with the estimated aggregate distribution of 
the risk parameter, we are able to test the reliability of the rational expectation hypothesis. 
Thus, we are able to achieve two things. The first is to distinguish between 
CRRAM and linear bidding rules.4 The second is to test the rational expectation 
hypothesis by comparing the beliefs of aggregate risk behavior to the estimated aggregate 
risk behavior. 
A subtle but imponant distinction should be emphasized. Previous studies5 have 
tested game theoretic formulations against ad hoc linear decision rules where the latter 
included a hypothesis of how linear behavior would change in response to changes in the 
. parameters of the economic environment. The ad hoc rules were rejected because they 
failed to track behavior across changing environments as well as the behavior was tracked 
by game theoretic models. In some sense. it is the assumption of how linear behavior
changes across different economic environments instead of the assumption of linearity that
2A paper by Palfrey ( 1985) is a possible e.cep11on. He studied the bundling of values each of which is 
drawn from a rectangular distribution. Thus. the value of a bundle would be drawn from a nonuniform 
distribution. Palfrey studied only risk neutral models. 
3In CSW ( 1988) a portion of the bidding lunc11on is actually nonlinear but they did not utilize the 
nonlinear data in their estimates. 
4In CSW ( 1984) in which mulliple umt dIScnmrnatory auCllons were conducted. and Kagel and Levin 
( 1988) in which third price auctions were conducted. subjects' behavior was not consistent with risk 
aversion under the Nash equilibrium. Sub1ec1s appear 10 be risk loving if Nash equilibrium theory was 
applied. These facts create a type of paradox because they suggest that people sometimes behave as if they 
are risk averse and other times behave as if they arc·risk loving. The existence of such inconsistencies 
casts doubt on the whole theory. 
5Kagel. Harstad. and Levin. 1987. 
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is rejected. And, since the assumption about how the use of ad hoc rules might change 
with changes in the economic environment is itself ad hoc, the methodology has an
inherent weakness that is difficult to overcome. By contrast, this study focuses on those 
same ad hoc linear rules within a given economic environment and asks if the linear aspect
of the rules generates statistical models that are as good as those derived from game 
theory. Thus, the methodology supplements other studies in an important way. The three 
linear models (the MM, the SIMAM, and the SOPAM) studied in this paper are designed 
with this fact in mind. Each model assumes a different set of characteristic parameters in a 
different economic environment 
2 Experimental Design 
A series of six experiments were conducted. 6 All the experiments were carried out 
in Caltech's Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science with help from 
networking software. The instructions read to the subjects are in Appendix A. 
Twelve subjects were in each experiment Some subjects participated in more than 
one experiment The experiments were conducted in periods. In each period, the subjects 
were randomly divided into groups of three who would bid against each other in a sealed 
bid auction. Then the private values of a subject were revealed (only to that subject) on 
the subject's computer screen. Then a first price auction was conducted among each 
group of three. 
In considering and discussing the models some care must be exercised to avoid 
confusion among the various units used in theory, observation, payoffs, etc. Subjects 
operated in a space characterized by units called francs. The information that subjects 
received and the decisions that subjects made, the entire message space, was defined in 
these franc units. Each franc could be convened to U.S. dollars at a rate (privately) 
known to the subject. 
Each private value was generated by the following scheme: let v be a random 
variable where VE [0,1) and with disoibution 
H(v) 
{2av 
2(1 -a)1· + 2a -1
where a is a parameter. 
if 0 $ v < + 
if-!: $ v :> l 
= 
6 Actually. 8 experiments were conducted. The first of the two experiments not reported was a pilot 
experiment Instead of the computers. it was conducted on a chalkboard by an auctioneer. In the second 
experiment that is not reponed. only five data points were collected. 
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Again, as a reminder, we note that the private franc value V, received by a subject, is
V= T + 1 OOOv where Tis the "offset"
Each subject was given the distribution described above. Furthermore, each was 
given a table in which the probability of each value is listed. This table was part of the 
instructions. The subjects were also told that the amount of dollars they would be paid at 
the end of the experiment would be a conversion rate times their franc earnings in the 
experiment 
· Table 1 summarizes the parameters used in the experiments. Parameters include 
the subject pool, the franc conversion rate, number of subjects, etc. The important 
parameters are those that determine the distribution function from which private values 
were drawn. 
There are two important parameters to consider in the generation of private values. 
Both parameters define types of controls in the experiments. First, the parameter a 
dictates the slopes and the slope change of the distribution function at the midpoint of the 
support. In our experiments, a =  0.8 and a= 0.2 were used. 
Second, the offset T is the lowest possible private value that can occur. Since the 
length of the support of private values is fixed to 1000, the support is the interval [offset, 
offset+ 1000] = [T,T + 1000]. The bidding functions from CRRAM go through the point 
(T,n. In our experiments, two values of the variable offset were chosen, T = 0 and T = 
500. See Figures 5A and 5B for graphs of the distribution functions. 
As an illustration of the importance of the two parameters, consider how they can 
be used to distinguish between behavior generated by a naive markdown rule as opposed 
to behavior generated by a game theoretic model. Consider the case in which the offset is 
500. 1f the subjects are following a naive markdown rule, then their bid functions go 
through (0,0) but not through (500,500) as is predicted by game theoretic models. 
Therefore, whether the bidding behavior goes through (500,500) in the experiments where 
offset = 500 can be used as an extra test of the CRRAM and the ad hoc rule of behavior. 
3 Overview of Models 
Theory is discussed in normalized units. By normalizing key variables to take 
values in the interval [O, I] all derivations and discussions are simpler. In the experiments, 
it is not necessary that the private values are in the interval of [0,1]. Lemma 3 proves the 
invariance of the theory under linear transformations for the most general case considered 
in this paper. 
The central variables are bids and private values. When franc units which are used 
in the experiments are intended the notations will be upper case B and V for bids and
private values, respectively, and in normalized units that will typically be used in 
theoretical derivations, the script b and v will be used for the two variables, respectively.
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For all experiments V takes values in some interval of length 1000. Specifically, 
Ve [T,T + 1000] where the parameter Twill be called the "offset" which can vary across
experiments. The variable v will take values in the interval [0,1] and thus V = T + lOOOv. 
All figures containing data and some of the econometrics will be presented in terms of V
but the technical theoretical discussions will be in terms of v. 
Because the models are complex, a brief overview of the issues and the models 
might be useful. The following are all of the models studied in the literature. A brief 
discussion of the models is also provided. From this discussion an overview of our 
experimental design can also be inferred. 
In all the models, the following assumptions are made: 
1. Subjects are expected utility maximizers with increasing utility for money.
2. Subjects have the following information before making a bid:
(a) his/her private value; 
(b) number of subjects he/she is bidding against; 
(c) the fact that all values drawn are i.i.d.; 
(d) the distribution from which the values are drawn is publicly known. 
3. Rec all from last secti on, di stri bu tion of normalized private values are of the following
form:
H(v) = 
{2av 
2(1-a)v+2a-1 
if0$v<! 
if+$ v $I 
Recall that the pri vate valu e seen by a su bjec t i s  V = T + lOOOv. So, both V and v can
be c alled the " pri vate valu e" wi th out c onfu si on. Th e parameter a adds c ontrol to the
experi ment as doe s the pa ramet er T. 
N otice  that the di stri bu ti on H(.) i s  not uniform over i ts support In previous 
experi ments that have stu di ed bi dding in nonaffiliated environments, the distribution of
pri vate values has alw ays been unif orm. Thi s departu re fr om previ ou s studies is the key 
to the interpretation of the experiments. 
The following models are stu di ed: 
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I. The Markdown Model (MM) 
This model holds that people follow a rule of thumb based on their private values. The 
bid will be a proportion of the value. Where v = private value randomly drawn, the 
model has the form 
bid = pv.
Without tracking the implications of other variables such as the number of bidders or 
information, etc., MM is not distinguishable from the Nash equilibrium behavior under 
uniformly distributed private values. An example is contained in Figure I. 
2. The Simple Ad hoc Model (SIMAM)
This model is slight generalization of MM to allow for the possibility that the bidding
function might not go through the origin. When values are sufficiently low people, may
simply bid zero. The function is
bid= a+ Pv. 
Measured bidding functions (CSW, 1988) have the property that a ;e 0. An example is 
in Figure 1. 
3. The Sophisticated Ad hoc Model (SOPAM)
This model assumes that subjects use a more sophisticated rule of thumb. The model
has the form
bid = 
{a +Pv 
a +Pv +y(v-0.5)
ifO:o;v< � 
if � ::;v::;J
An example is in Figure 2. This is essentially a two-piece linear rule where the subject 
follows different linear rules when his private value is in [0,1/2] and [112,1]. The 
strategic implication of this will be more clear in the experimental design part of this 
paper. 
4 .  The Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium Model (RNNE) 
Subjects are identical and risk neutral utility maximizers (i.e., u(x) =x). This model is 
not consistent with CSW's experimental data because their data uniformly lie above the 
risk neutral bid function. Generally. this fact has been interpreted as a manifestation of 
risk aversion. For the parametric environment used in our experiments, examples of the 
RNNE bid function are contained in Figures 3A and 3B for the cases where a = 0.8 and 
a = 0.2 respectively. 
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5. The Risk Aversion Symmetric Nash Equilibrium Model (RASNE)
Subjects are identical utility maximizers. Each subject has a one-parameter 
concave/linear utility function in the form u(x) = x'. This model is also not consistent
with CSW's data because the hypothesis that agents are identical can be rejected. An
example of RASNE bid function is contained in Figures 3A and 3B for a =  0.8 and a =
0.2, respectively. The RASNE bid function has a property that it lies above the RNNE 
bid function for both values of a .  This property is the reason that RASNE provides a 
better account of the CSW data than does the RNNE. 
6. The Constant Relative Risk Aversion Model (CRRAM)
Subjects do not have identical utility functions. Each subject has a one-parameter 
utility in the form of u( x) = x" . The risk parameters r are distributed according to some
publicly known distribution G(r). In the special case when the variance of G(r) is zero,
the CRRAM becomes the RASNE.
Figures 4A through 4F illustrate different features of the CRRAM bidding function.
The CRRAM individual bidding function, which will be described in Section 4, is a
function of individual risk parameter r, the mean, E(r), of the distribution G(r) and the
price variance, s;, of G(r). In previous theoretical studies, bids were found to be
increasing with increasing risk aversion in first price auctions. The effects of E(r) and
s; on the bidding function are more subtle and less intuitive. Both variables control
the slope and the curvature of the bidding function in the interval [0.5,1]. As one can
see from Figures 4B and 4C, the bidding function is relatively constant to varying E(r)
and s; in the interval [0,0.5]. Figures 4D through 4F show the effects of varying r,
E(r) ands; , respectively, when a =  0.2 as opposed to the a =  0.8 used in Figures 4A
through 4C.
The CRRAM is the most supponed theory in the CSW study. However, as was
mentioned in the introduction, there are still some inconsistencies between the data and
CRRAM:
(a) In some cases, the subject has a bidding function with a significant nonzero 
intercept, while CRRAM predicts a zero intercept (CSW). 
(b) In other experimental data. bidding is observed to be consistently above the 
dominant strategy in single unit second price auction (KHL, p. 33). 
(c) In third price auctions, 60 percent of all bids lie above the RNNE line with ten 
subjects, while risk aversion requires bids to be below the RNNE line. This may 
be an indication of failure of the theory. or that subjects are risk-loving (Kagel and 
Levin, 1991). 
7. The Belief Free Constant Relative Risk Aversion Model (BFCRRAM)
The BFCRRAM is identical to the CRRAM except that the rational expectation
hypothesis is relaxed. The rational expectation hypothesis is imposed on the estimation
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procedure by requiring the subject to believe the mean and variance of the distribution 
of the risk parameters r; are equal to the estimated ones.
In the BFCRRAM, the beliefs about the mean and variance of the distribution of risk 
attitudes (which are used to derive the optimal individual behavior) are estimated as 
free parameters. In contrast, when the CRRAM is estimated, these two parameters are 
restricted to _the average and the variance estimate of the estimated individual risk 
parameters. 
4 Formal Theoretical Development 
This section develops the CRRAM model in our special nonlinear case and shows 
how it can be solved by numerical methods. 
Consider a first price auction where there are N � 2 bidders. Each bidder's
monetary value v,, i = 1, .. .N, for the auctioned object is independently drawn from the
probability distribution with c.d.f. H(-) on [0,1]. It is assumed that each bidder knows his
own v; but knows only the distribution from which his rivals' values are drawn. Each
bidder is also assumed to know N, the number of bidders.
The one parameter utility of bidder i is u(x;r;) = x''. Assume that each bidder
knows his/her own risk parameter r,. Also, assume that r; is distributed independently with
distribution GO. Each bidder knows GO and he/she is an expected utility maximizer. 
Assume each bidder i believes everyone is using bidding function b(·;r), his
expected utility is Eu=(v - b)" {E,H(n(b,r)) )N-I where v =i's private value and 7t(·;r) =
inverse function of b(·;r). The notation £,denotes an expectation taken on r. 
Let 
To maximize Eu, the first order condition is
_ _'.!_+(N - l)E, {H (n(b.r)  
d1t(b,r)} / E,H(n(b,r)  = 0
v-b ab 
� E,H(n (h.r)  = _N -_I (n(b, 1: )-b )E{H (n(b,r) -
dn-'-(b_,r_) } 
� � 
with the substitution 1· = n(h,r,). 
f(b) = E,H(n (b.r)} / E, { H (n (h.r)  dn��,r)} 
N-1 
� f (b) = -(n(h.r, }-h)r, 
� n(b,r) = _1: _f (h) +b' N-1 
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(1) 
� im(b,r,) =-2_ f'(b)+l
ab N-1 
(2) 
As mentioned above, the form of distribution H(x) studied in our investigation is
J2ax H(x) = l�(l-a)x+ 2a-1
with density f 2a 
H(x)=l�(l-a) o::;;x<t +::;;x<l 
x;;:: 1
This distribution is uniform in the intervals [O,�] and [�,l]. But the probability of
being in either interval is different, where P(xe [0,�]) =a and P(xe [�,l]) = 1 - a. 
Substituting ( 1) into E,H(rc(b,r)), and writing E, in an integral form, we have
E,H(rc(b,r))= r··2a(-r-f(b)+b )dG(r)+ f'[ 2(1-a)(-r-f(b)+b )+2a-1 ]dG(v)+f.- dG(r)
J0 N -1 ., N -1 ., 
=f(b){-3!!_ r·· rdG(r)+ 2(l-a)J."' rdG(r)}+b{ 2aG(u,)N-1 Jo N-1 •, 
+ 2(1-a)[G(u2 )-G(u, )] } + 1-G(u2) + (2a -l)[G(u2 )-G(u1 )] 
N-1 1 N-1where u1 = --(--b) and u2 = --(1-b ).f(b) 2 f(b) 
Similarly, substituting (2) into£,{ H (1t(b,r)):} we have
£,{ H (rt(b,r)) arc��.r) } = f' 2a( N �If (b) + I  )dG(r) + 1' 2(1-a{N � l f (b) + 1 )dG(r)
= f (b)[-3!!_J"' rdG(r) + 2(l -a) f';dG(r)] N-1 o N-1 ., 
+2aG(U,) + 2(1-a)i G(u2) -G(u1 )]
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Let 
w; =-�� _ _r., rdG(r)+ 2(l-a)J."'rdG(r)
N-1Jo N-1 "' 
W2 =2aG(u1)+2(1-a)[G(u2)-G(u1)] 
W3 = (2a -l)[G(u2)-G(u1)]+ 1-G(u,)
Substituting 
From (1)  
1 
w;J(b)+ W,b+ W, = f(b)[(w;f (b)+ W,]) 
-:=;f(b)=l-
W, +
(W,b+W, )_1_ 
w; w; f(b) 
N-1 · 
==- f(b) =--(v-b) 
r, 
-:=;f(b)=N-l(dv -I
)
r, db 
�(2 
-b) �(I-b) 
andu, = , u, = � -
v-b v-b 
And (3) becomes
db (N -l)w; -=-------�----dv r'(W,b+W) (N-I+r )W-rW,+' • ' 
' ' ' - (v-b)(N-I) 
(3) 
(4) 
Equation (4) is a differential equation that allows one to solve for the optimal 
bidding function b(v;r) numerically. The following properties of the solution are useful: 
Lemma I) 
Lemma 2) 
Lemma3) 
b(O;r,) = 0. This gives us the initial condition for the differential 
equation (4)
lim 
db(v,r,) = n -1 
(see Appendix B for proof) 
....... o dv 12 -1 + r, 
if b(v; r,l is a solution to max.(v -x)r.{EH(n(x; r.)) r·•, then
b(v ; r.) is a solution to max.(v - x)" {E,H(n(x; r,)) r·•, where for all
A E 9\,� E 9\ + 
1 1  
ii=A.+�v 
b (v;r) =A.+� b(v ;r) 
H(A. + � y) = H(y) for ally ( see Appendix C for proof). 
Lemma 3 shows that the maximization problem is invariant to linear 
transformation. In our experiments, a number of different intervals were chosen as 
suppon of v. Lemma 3 legitimizes the use of (4) as the base solution for all of our 
parameter choices. 
We have initial condition b(O;r;) = 0, so b(v;r;) can be integrated numerically 
from (4). 
Notice that equation (4) depends upon the distribution G of r. We assumer has a 
log normal distribution. There are two intuitive reasons to make this choice. First, we 
believe that people tend to behave similarly. Second, the structure of the utility function 
constrains r on the open interval (0, oo). A Jog normal distribution has suppon on (0, oo). 
Let u0 and cr2 be the mean and variance of log(r).
The density is 
g(r) = _
I_ <t> ( log r - u,, ) 
cr r cr 
It is advantageous to parameterize Gin terms of E(r) and cr ; instead of u0 ,<J 2• 
E(r) = f,;g(r)dr 
= r��cog�-Uo)dr 
a u,•-=e =' 
= e2°'{)+2o. 
cr; = E(r1 ) - (£(r))2
' ' = e'"o+la' (l -ea ) 
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and 
1 
( 
cr2 
)u0 =logE(r)--log 1+--'-2 2 E(r) 
0'2 = log (i+ cr; 2) E(r) 
5 Data Analysis/Econometrics
The data is analyzed with the following goals in mind: 
1. To compare CRRAM to the Markdown Model (MM), the simple and
sophisticated ad hoc model (SIMAM and SUPAM).
2. To show (in a pseudo R2 sense) how well CRRAM explains the bids.
3. To test whether risk parameters of subjects in different experiments are drawn
from the same distribution.
4. To test whether the bidding functions go through the point (offset, offset)=
(T,T).
5. To test the rational expectation hypothesis.
Both the RNNE and RASNE models were also analyzed. Recall that RNNE and
RASNE are special cases of CRRAM and both models were rejected in CSW's paper. In
separate (unreported) tests, both RNNE and RASNE models can be rejected using the
likelihood ratio test 
Using the framework developed in Section 3, for given risk parameter r and risk 
distribution Gr, one can calculate the bidding function
b(v;r, E, (r),O' ; where E, (r) = J rdGr and cr ; = E, ((r -E(r))2).
where 
The following econometric model is used: 
B(-) 
r· l 
B., = B(l/.,:r,.E(r).a;) +f,,, (5) 
= CRRAM bidding function in franc units
= bid submitted by subject i at time t 
= private value of subject i at time t 
is distributed i.i.d. n(O, O'; ) 
= risk parameter of subject i 
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The following assumptions are made: 
• The variance of cr; of�,, is constant across periods but can vary from subject to
subject
• Since b(vu, r;, E(r), cr:) depends also on E(r) and cr 2, we use F=.!.. L· '· to estimate, r l l 
E(r) and -1-_L.Cr; -f)2 to estimatecr;.
n-1 ' 
n 
The method of maximum likelihood is used to estimate r1 for all subjects. The 
results will be presented in the next section. The maximum likelihood procedures were 
carried out on a CRAY X-MP/18 supercomputer at the Jet Propulsion Laboratories and a 
CRAY Y/MP supercomputer at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. 
Each evaluation of the bidding function typically included a 100-step integration. 
Since the bidding functions of the subjects are all interrelated under CRRAM , the risk 
aversion parameters of all subjects in an experiment have to be estimated simultaneously. 
Each experiment consists of 12 subjects and typically 100 bids per subject. To calculate 
the maximum likelihood, we have to maximize a likelihood function with 1200 data points 
in a 12 dimensional space. With the level of precision used in the analysis, the calculation 
typically takes about six to twelve hours on a CRAY. Better precision of the integration 
routine may be desirable since some divergence of bidding functions were encountered 
upon integration. None of the numbers reported below involve the divergence problem. 
The problem itself can be overcome by computer techniques or by a willingness to devote 
much more time to computations. 
The pseudo R2 was also calculated for each subject. The pseudo R2 is a measure 
of how much explaining power the model has. 
where 
, SSR. Pseudo R· = 1- = ' SSR. 
SSR, =°ICE,, -B(V,,.�.E(r).cr;))2 
SSR, =I (B,  - B, )' 
(6) 
The pseudo R2 is between 0 and 1 since SSR, $ SSR, . The closer the pseudo R2 is 
to 1, the better explanatory power the model has. A model that explains all the variation 
of the bids will have a pseudo R2 of l. The result is presented in the next section. 
Maximum likelihood estimation is also carried out for the following two ad hoc models: 
The Simple Ad hoc Model (SIMAM) 
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And the Sophisticated Ad hoc Model (SOPAM) 
{a.,+ (3, (V,, -T) +�,, B. = " 
a.,+ (3, (V,, -T) +y, (V,, -T-500)+�,, 
if T!>V,, <T+500 
if T + 500 ::;; V,, ::;; T + 1000 
(7) 
(8) 
where 1;;1 is i.i.d. with constant variance er�. These two models have been outlined
in previous sections. Both models are rewritten in a statistical fashion here.
The Vuong's model Selection Test was used to compare the SIMAM and the 
SOPAM to the CRRAM. Let us consider the general case where one wants to select 
between two strictly non-nested models[ and g. 
Let 
y = {y, r=, = I be a data set with n points.
e = parameter of model[ 
'Y = parameter of model g
e. = maximum likelihood estimate of 0 under Y
'Y" = maximum likelihood estimate of 'Y under Y
11 = likelihood function off 
lg = likelihood function of g
Define the estimated log likelihood ratio off to g to be 
Now, consider the hypothesis Ho: f and Rare equivalent,
-,_l � r l,(Y,� .l]' r l � l,(y,� .)l W = - £..., log - -L.,log -�-" n '"' l,(Y,� .l n ,., l,(Y,�J 
Consider the following three hypotheses: 
• Ho:f and g are equivalent,
• H/ f is better than g, and
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• Hg: g is better than f
Vuong's theorem 5.2 states that 
(i) under Ho: n-112LR.(0./j .)IW. "'· )n(0,1) 
(ii) under H1 : n-112 LR. (0. ;j.) I W. ·�· -too 
a.s. . -00 (9) 
Equation (9) provides a very simple directional test for model selection. If the
value of the statistics n-112 LR. (0. ,Y.) I w. is higher than some critical value c, which is
decided by the significance level, then one rejects the null hypothesis that the models are 
equivalent in favor off being better than g. If n-112 LR. (0. ,y . ) !W. is smaller than -c then
one rejects the null hypothesis in favor of g being better thanf Finally, if 
I n-112 LR. (0., y.) I W. I S c then one cannot discriminate between f and g given the data.
In our case, let 
Le RR AM = 
LMM = 
LstMAM = 
LsoPAM = 
LR.CRRAMMM = 
LR.CRRAMSIMAM = 
LR.CRRAMSOPAM = 
WCRRAM = 
WCRRAMS/MAN = 
WCRRAMSOP AM = 
n = 
estimated maximum Jog likelihood of CR RAM 
estimated maximum log likelihood of M M 
estimated maximum Jog likelihood of SIM AM 
estimated maximum Jog likelihood of SOP AM
estimated maximum log likelihood ratio of CRRAM to M M  
estimated maximum log likelihood ratio of  CR RAM to  SIM AM 
estimated maximum log likelihood ratio of CR RAM to S 0 PAM 
estimated variance of LR. :.iRRAM 
estimated variance of LR CRRAMS/MAM 
estimated variance of LRcRRAMSOP AM
number of data points in an experiment 
The critical value of a normal distribution at 0.05 level of significance is 1.65. 
Therefore, we select CRRAM over SIMAM if ,,-"2 LRi,�i::/ /W5;!i::;:' > 1.65 and SIMAM
over CRRAM if ,,-112 LR.i,�i::/ I ws;!� < 1.65 and we cannot select one over the other if
I n-112 LR.i,i;:;: f Ws;!i::;:' ISJ.65. Similarly. we can compare CRRAM to SOP AM and MM.
Vuong noted the existence of other model selection criteria that, when 
appropriately normalized. are asymptotically eq uivalent to the LR-statistics (9). 
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More generally, let 
u.ce .. 1 .) =LR.ca •• 1 .)-K.ct ,g)
where K.(f, g) is a correction factor depending on the characteristics of models
f and g. The statements in (9) hold true when LR .. is replaced by LR • . 
It is found that some of our results depend on whether a correction factor 
K.(f,g) = p - q or K.(f,g) =!../ogn -!/ogn is applied. (Where p= number of
2 2 
parameters off, g =number of parameters of g). 
We have also considered using other procedures like the bounded-size likelihood 
ratio (BLR) test. We decided that the Vuong's Model Selection Test is most suited to our 
purpose. 
In the maximum likelihood procedures, we obtained estimates of the risk 
parameters of the subjects. In each experiment there are 12 estimates. The 
Kolomogorov-Smirnov test was used to test whether the sets of 12 estimates from 
different experiments are drawn from the same distribution or not. The results are 
presented in the next section. 
To test whether the bidding functions go through the point (offset, offset), the 
following econometric model was used: 
· 
5 
B,, =a.,+ L,BF(V,  -offset)j + �,,
j=i 
If the bidding function for subject i goes through (offset, offset), then 
a., = offset. After a., is estimated, a simple t-test can tell whether a; is significantly 
different from the offset. The results are reponed in the next section. 
(10) 
The reason a polynomial model was chosen is that any well-behaved function can 
be closely approximated by a finite polynomial. 
6 Results 
The CRRAM is estimated for the six experiments conducted. The eight figures, 
6A through 6H, are examples of individual bids and estimated bidding functions . As can 
be seen in the figures, the CRRAM can yield highly nonlinear predictions. Among these 
figures there are "good fits" (Figure 6A), "worst fits" (Figure 6B) and "typical fits" from 
each experiment (Figures 6C-6H). Notice that in Figures 60 and 6F the bidding functions 
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have slightly different features than the others probably due to the fact that in 6D and 6F 
(experiment 2 and 4), the parameter a= 0.2 while in the others a= 0.8. 
Together these figures suggest how the CRRAM respond to the single (risk
aversion) parameter. These visual supports for the CRRAM suggest that if people are
using rules of thumb, then these rules of thumb highly resemble the CRRAM. 
Result 0 is included for completeness. It deals with the special cases of risk 
neutrality and with the risk averse symmetric cases with homogenous bidders. As was 
mentioned, the RNNE and RASNE are both special cases of the CRRAM which have
been rejected by CSW. RAS NE is the special case where the constraint 'i = r2 =· · · = r12 
is put on the CRRAM. RNNE is the special case where the constraint r1 = r2 =···= r12 = 1
is put on the CRRAM. Result 0 simply states that neither of these models can be accepted 
and so the result sets the stage for an investigation of a more elaborate class of models. 
Result 0: Both the RNNE and the RASNE can be rejected. 
Support: Both constraints are tested using the likelihood ratio test. The statistics 
of the test of constraints are listed in Table 2B. In separate tests, both RNNE and 
RASNE models can be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance in all of the six 
experiments and also in the pooled data.D 
The Result 0 is consistent with the CSW conclusion that subjects behave as if they 
are risk averse and heterogeneous. It is therefore necessary to explore in detail the more 
general model that they propose. 
The results of the estimation of the CRRAM and other models together with 
relevant summary statistics are contained in Tables 2 through 5. Table 2 contains the 
likelihood estimates of the models, the results of Vuong's Model Selection Test discussed 
in Section 5 above and the results of testing the rational expectation hypothesis. For each · 
of the models considered Table 3 gives the means and the standard deviation of the 
pseudo R' of all of the subjects in all experiments. Table 4 contains the means and the 
standard deviations of the estimates of the CRRAM risk aversion parameters of subjects. 
Table 5 contains statistics to determine if the estimates of the risk aversion parameters 
from different experiments are drawn from the same disnibution. 
The first result addresses one of the cenrral issues directly. When separated within 
a fixed parametric environment, the CRRAM captures the subtleties of individual behavior 
that the Markdown Model does not capture. 
Result I: The CRRAM is a better model than the Markdown Model (MM). 
Support: The support of this result comes at two levels of data analysis. The first 
is the data set for each whole experiments using the Vuong's Model Selection Test. In 
five of the six experiments. the MM can be rejected at five percent significance in favor of 
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the CRRAM . In experiment 5, one cannot discriminate between the two models given the
data. The statistics are in Table 2A. The analysis of the pooled data also favors the 
CRRAM . 
The second level of support for Result 1 is provided by the pseudo R2 analysis. In
72 percent of the subjects, the CRRAM gives a higher pseudo R2 than MM reflecting a
greater explanatory power of the CRRAM. These higher proportions are reflected in the 
tendency for higher means of the pseudo R2 contained in Table 3 which are reported here
rather than the pseudo R2 for each of the individuals.D
Result 1 indicates that people respond to the strategic consideration of the
environment (CRRAM) instead of following some rule of thumb (MM) blindly. Result 2 
is that even when we increase the sophistication of the rule of thumb to the two parameter 
SIMAM, the CRRAM is still a better model than the rule of thumb. This result suggests 
that the full power of the rationality postulates does a better job of describing choice 
behavior than a model that suggests that people follow a linear rule of thumb with a free 
slope and free intercept. Notice that SIMAM has double the number of parameters than 
CRRAM has. 
Result 2: The CRRAM is a better statistical model than the Simple Ad hoc Model 
(SIMAM). 
Support: Using the Vuong's Selection Test, in three out of six experiments and in 
the pooled data set, the SIMAM can be rejected in favor of the CRRAM at five percent 
significance level independent of whether the correction factor K. is applied. In the 
remaining three experiments, if the correction factor K. is applied, all are indistinguishable 
from the CRRAM. However, if the correction factor K. is not applied, in two experiments 
(experiments 2 and 4) the CRRAM can be rejected at the five percent level in favor of
SIMAM. Notice that in the experiments that the CRRAM performed worst (experiments 
2 and 4), the parameter a= 0.2. The statistics are listed in Table 2A.
In 56 percent of the subjects, the CRRAM gives a higher pseudo R2 than the 
SIMAM. Again, this phenomenon is reflected in the means reported in Table 3.0 
The support for Result 2 contains the perplexing fact that serves as a warning not
to be over confident about the rationality postulates. When the probabilities governing 
individual values changed across experiments, support for rationality was reversed. Thus, 
Result 2 is sensitive to the under! ying environment
The next result, Result 3, gives the limit of the explanatory power of the CRRAM 
in comparison to rules of thumb. The result is that the SOPAM explains the data better 
than CRRAM. The SOPAM can be viewed as a natural extension of the SIMAM. It also 
captures aspects of the strategic situations since the bid function is allowed to change 
slope when the distribution of private values changes slope. Formally stated the result is : 
19 
Result 3: The Sophisticated Ad hoc Model (SOPAM) is a better statistical model 
than the CRRAM. 
Support: When Vuong's Model Selection Test is used without the correction 
factor K., in all six experiments and the pooled data the CRRAM can be rejected at five 
percent significance in favor of the SOP AM. When the correction factor is applied, the 
CRRAM can be rejected in four of the six experiments. The statistics are listed in Table 
2A. In 92 percent of the subjects, the SOP AM gives a higher pseudo R2 than the 
CRRAM. This phenomenon is reflected in the means reported in Table 3.D 
The SOP AM is a piece wise linear decision rule. The pieces cover what might be 
considered to be the prominent parts of the individual values space. Thus, SOP AM in 
conjunction with some rule of thumb regarding where the breaks of the decision rule might 
fall is in a sense the limits to which rationality is exhibited. 
The results do not appear to be due to statistical techniques. Result 1 is
independent of the correction factor K, = f log(n) -f log(n) . Results 2 and 3 depend
only slightly on this correction factor. As mentioned in Section 5, since all the ad hoc
models have at least as many parameters as CRRAM, applying K. will only tilt the 
Vuong's Selection Test in favor of the CRRAM. 
Notice that the CRRAM performs better in experiments 1,3,5 and 6 in which the 
experimental parameter a = 0.8 than in experiments 2 and 4 in which a =  0.2. It seems 
that the performance of the CRRAM depends on the experimental environment 
Results 1 through 3 evaluate the rationality postulates relative to linear rules of 
thumb behaviors. There is no absolute measure to judge how well a model explains data. 
However, there are facts that suggests that the CRRAM is explaining the data reasonably 
well. The following facts should help the reader to form his/her own judgment about the 
absolute explanatory power of the CRRAM. 
Result 4: The CRRAM has good explanatory power. 
Support: The pseudo R2 s are generally high. Ninety percent of the subjects have 
pseudo R's greater than 0.8 and 67 percent of the subjects have pseudo R2s greater than 
0.9. Figure 7 shows the distribution of pseudo R2 of all subjects for all experiments. 
The CRRAM predicts that the bidding functions go through the point (offset, 
offset) = (T,T). Equation (11) was estimated for each of the 72 subjects. For each a t-test
was performed on the hypothesis that a. = T (i.e .. the bidding function goes through the 
point (T,T)). For 86 percent of the subjects the hypothesis a, = T cannot be rejected at the 
five percent level of significance.D 
The support of the above result suggests an important aspect of model evaluation 
that can be easily overlooked. The CRRAM has a property of translational invariance. 
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That is, a translation of the support of probabilities of values leaves the prediction of the 
theory the same relative to the translation. This can be seen in Figures 6E, 6F and 6H in 
which the predictions of CRRAM with the offset parameters are displayed against the 
data. This is actually a translation of the predicted bidding function of the case with offset 
equal to zero by adding (500,500) to each point. The support of Result 4 suggests that 
the data has this property also. In particular, if the SOPAM is modified to, say, a
sophisticated two piece linear bidding rule such that value = 0 implies bid = 0, then the 
CRRAM is a better model. If a rule of thumb does not have this translational invariant 
property, it is most likely that it will be inconsistent with the data. Formally the 
observation is as follows: 
Observation: The data are consistent with a model with the translational invariant 
property. That is, rules of thumb that are not translation invariant will generally be 
rejected in favor of the CRRAM. 
Until now, the analysis has focused on the full set of rationality postulates in 
comparison with the ad hoc rules. The natural questions to pose concern the ability of 
some reduced set of rationality postulates to explain the data. The next result addresses 
the issue of the rational expectation hypothesis and identifies it as a possible source of 
error of the CRRAM. As stated in the result, in all the experiments, the rational 
expectation hypothesis is not consistent with the data. This result suggests that subjects 
have beliefs about the distribution of risk behavior that are neither true nor consistent with 
each other. 
Result 5: The rational expectation hypothesis is rejected. Hence, the parameters 
E(r) and cr; from individual bidding functions are not consistent with the hypothesis that 
they are the same across individuals. 
Support: Using the likelihood ratio test, we reject the hypothesis that all the 
individual E(r) and cr; are eq u al at five percent significance in all experiments. The
statistics are l isted in Table 2B. D 
Since the rational ex pect ation hypothesis is rejected in Result 5 a natural exrension 
of the investig ation is to investig ate the CR RAM w ithout the rational expectation 
hypothes is. We will call the re l axed model the B elief Free CRRAM (BFCRRAM). The 
strategy is to test B FCRRAM agai nst the three linear decision rules (MM, SIMAM and 
SOP AM). Using the set of three l i near rules as a benchmark, we are able to measure the 
"degree" of rationality exhibited by the subjects. Although the BFCRRAM gained 
substantial accuracy over CRRAM as demonstr ated by Result 5, its relative accuracy 
compared to the three linear rules did not change. The BFCRRAM is more accurate than 
MM and SIMAM but not quite as accurJte as SOPAM. This fact is stated formally in the 
next three results. 
Result 6: The B FCRRAM is a better statistical model than the Markdown 
Model (MM). 
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Support: Using the Vuong's Selection Test, in five out of six experiments and in 
the pooled data set, the MM can be rejected in favor of the BFCRRAM at a five percent 
significance level. The statistics are listed in Table 2C. D 
Result 7: The BFCRRAM is a better statistical model than the Simple Ad hoc 
Model (SIMAM). 
Support: Using the Vuong's Selection Test, in five out of six experiments and in 
the pooled data set, the MM can be rejected in favor of the CRRAM at a five percent 
significance level. The statistics are listed in Table 2C.D 
Result 8: The Sophisticated Ad hoc Model is a better statistical model than the 
BFCRRAM. 
Support: Using the Vuong's Selection Test, the BFCRRAM is rejected in favor 
of the SOP AM in experiment l and the SOPAM is rejected in favor of the BFCRRAM in 
experiment 2 - both at the five percent significance level. In all the other experiments, 
they are indistinguishable from each other. In the pooled data set, the BFCRRAM is 
rejected in favor of the SO PAM. The statistics are listed in Table 2C.D 
Notice that the support for SOPAM over BFCRRAM is based only on the pooled 
data thereby suggesting that the results of statistical tests of BFCRRAM against rules like 
the SOP AM might be sensitive to econometric specification. In addition, the great 
improvement of the CRRAM when modified to become the BFCRRAM demonstrates the 
constraining power of the theory of beliefs in the game theoretic model and suggests that 
generalization of the theory should focus on beliefs. Such an approach is precisely the 
same as that of GPV who identified the consistency conditions of game theory as its major 
source of error. 
The next result addresses the validity of the assumption employed in the 
application of the CRRAM that the risk parameters of the subjects are distributed with a 
log-normal distribution. The result is that the estimated risk parameters {r;} are consistent
with a log-normal distribution with mean r = '.; I r,  and variance -;;'.:i I, (r, - P)2 • 
Result 9: The risk parameters estimated from the data in all the experiments are 
consistent with the hypothesis that they are log-normally distributed. 
Support: The Kolomogorov-Smimov test statistics are listed in Table 5. For risk 
parameters estimated from all experiments, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the risk 
parameters are drawn from a log-normal distribution at a five percent level of 
significance. D 
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The next result addresses a very interesting question. Is the distribution of risk 
parameters estimated from the data the same for all experiments? The subjects in these 
experiments are drawn independently from the same general population. It is not 
unreasonable to expect the measured risk attitudes in different experiments to be 
statistically similar. If they were not the same then, the possibility exists that either the
sampling of subjects does not result from independent draws from the population or there 
is an error in CRRAM in a broad sense. Randomly drawn risk attitudes should show up 
as a random distribution of risk parameter estimates when measured by the application of 
CRRAM. If the subjects' risk parameters are drawn from the same distribution, it is not 
necessary for them to have the same beliefs of this distribution. Table 4 shows the means 
and the standard deviations of the estimated risk parameter r in all of the experiments. 
The result is that all of the subjects in most of the experiments behaved as if their risk 
parameters were drawn from the same distribution. 
Result 10: The risk parameters estimated from the data in most of the six 
different experiments are consistent with the hypothesis that they are drawn from the same 
distribution. 
Support: Kolomogorov-Smirnov test statistics are listed in Table 5. For 12  out 
of 1 5  possible pairings of different experiments, we fail to reject the hypothesis that risk 
parameter estimates are drawn from the same distribution at five percent significance.D 
7 Summary and Conclusions 
Thi s research was motivated by the possibility that people may not exhibit the full 
degree of rationali ty that game theory assumes. 1n particular, two sets of principles of 
rationality are of interest The first set consi sts of the principles of maximizing behavi or. 
Thi s set of princi ples i s  tested against the alternatives that people are following si mple 
rules of thumb. We use a set of three linear deci sion rules (the MM, the SIMAM and the 
SOP AM. whi ch i s  a series of increasingly sophisticated linear rules) as a benchmark of 
how much maximi zing behavi or the subjects are exhibi ting. The second set of princi ples 
of rationali ty consi sts of those whi ch generate the rati onal expectation hypothesi s whi ch 
states that, in equi li bri um. all of the beli efs of all of the agents are consi stent wi th 
experience/reali ty. We estimated the subjects' beliefs about the aggregate risk behavi or in 
the unconstrained CRRAM and thus we were able to test whether the beli efs are 
consi stent wi th the true aggregate ri sk behavi or. 
The first two results suggests that the princi ples of maxi mizing behavior should not 
be abandoned in favor of si mple ad hoc deci si on rules in a given economic environment. 
The increasingly sophi sti cated linear rules of thumb are MM, SIMAM, and SOPAM. The 
CRRAM i s  better than the first two. The SOP AM was introduced to answer the question 
of how complicated can one get in the class of pi ece wi se linear models before a rule i s  
found that outperforms the CRRAM� Result 3 shows that the CRRAM does not perform 
as well as the SOPAM. Thi s by no means suggests that people are using non-optimal 
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rules of thumb disregarding the strategic situation. In fact, if the SOP AM is constrained 
to assume some constant characteristic parameters regardless of the environment (e.g., if 
the SOP AM is constrained to go through (0,0) regardless of what the offset is) then there 
is no doubt that the CRRAM will perform better than all three models. Thus, we know 
that game theory has limitations on its ability to predict but if it is to be improved upon by
ad hoc models then those models must exhibit some sophistication and leave parameters 
free to vary from environment to environment 
Result 5 suggests that the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis is 
supported by the data. Subjects do not appear to have fully consistent beliefs about the 
true aggregate risk behavior of their fellow subjects. However, given beliefs, a subject's 
behavior is quite consistent with game theory. 
Results 6, 7, and 8 show that with no constraint that requires subjects' beliefs to be
the truth, the CRRAM performs better than the two simpler linear models (MM and 
SIMAM) while CRRAM still does not perform as well as the sophisticated piece wise 
linear model (SOPAM). The accuracy gap between the two models is very small and a 
real possibility exists that Result 8 might be sensitive to the statistical specifications of the 
model. That is, game theory without the full constraints of rational expectations is 
sufficiently accurate that the measurement technology might be a real factor in 
comparisons with the most sophisticated rules of thumb. 
In summary, the results in this paper suggest that the fundamental conclusions of 
CSW, KHL and GPV are all correct. The simple markdown models do not account for 
behavior as well as does the CRRAM which is based on game theory. In spite of a long 
history of application in the social and economic sciences as alternatives to models based 
on strategic and rational behavior, neither the simple markdown model nor its natural 
generalization (SIMAM) are as good as the CRRAM. The CRRAM is reasonably 
accurate in a certain absolute sense (Result 4) and the estimates of the parameters have a 
type of internal consistency that might be expected (Result 9 and 1 0). However, while the 
support for optimal strategic behavior is strong, it appears that people do not exhibit the 
full extent of the kind of rationality that game theory assumes. The CRRAM is not as 
accurate as the SOP AM nor is the rational expectation hypothesis supported by the data 
(Result 3 and 5). 
It stands as an challenge for theorists to improve game theory to account for the 
limited form of rationality that is observed in these experiments. The results reported here 
suggest that the theory of beliefs and belief formation might be the most productive place 
to work. The power of the theory is increased dramatically when the constraints that the 
theory places on beliefs is relaxed. In this sense. the conclusion of this study are precisely 
the same as GPV who concluded that the "consistency conditions" of game theory were 
the primary source of the theory's error. 
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Appendix A 
General Information: 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The 
instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you 
might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash after the 
experiment 
In this experiment, you are going to participate in a market in which you will be 
buying units in a sequence of independent market days or trading periods. You will each 
receive a sequence of numbers from the computer, one for each period, which describe the 
value to you of any decisions you might make. These numbers may differ among 
individuals. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private 
information. 
Redemption Values and Earnings: 
During each market period you are free to purchase a unit if you want If you
purchase a unit, you will receive the redemption value indicated on the computer for that 
period. Your earnings from a unit purchased is the difference between your redemption 
value for that unit and the price you paid for the unit The formula is: 
Your earnings = (redemption value) - (purchase price). 
Suppose, for example, that you buy a unit and that your redemption value is 200. If you
pay 150 for the unit, then your earnings are 
Earnings from unit = 200 - 150 = 50. 
Notice that if the price paid is above the redemption value, the buyer experiences a loss. 
Anyone with a net loss at the end of the experiment is allowed to work to pay the loss at a 
rate of $6 per hour. The earnings will be calculated for you by the computer in each 
period. The currency used in the market is francs. Each franc will be worth __ 
dollars to you. 
Market Organi7.ation: 
In each period, one or more markets will be open and you will be participating in 
one of the markets. The computer will determine which market you are participating in 
randomly. There will be 3 participants in each market. In each market, buyers submit bids 
by entering their bid into the computer when prompted. The bids will be arranged from 
the highest bid to the lowest. A single unit will be sold to the highest bidder. The highest 
bid and the bidder of each market will be announced by the computer. The buyer will pay 
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a price equal to the bid and as a result will earn the difference between his/her redemption
value for the unit and the bid Ties are resolved randomly by the computer. The bids of 
all other bidders are nullified. They receive no redemption value and pay nothing, and so 
have earning of zero for that period 
Determination of Redemption Values: 
For each buyer, the redemption value each period is determined randomly from the 
following distribution. The chance of having a value between 0 and 499 is 80% and each 
number from 0 to 499 has equal chance of appearing. The chance of having a value 
between 500 and 999 is 20% and each number from 500 to 999 has equal chance of 
appearing. It is as if each number between 0 and 499 is stamped on 4 balls and placed in
an urn. And each number between 500 and 999 is stamped on 1 ball and placed in the 
same urn. A draw from the urn determines the redemption value for an individual. The 
ball is replaced and a second draw determines the redemption value for another player. 
The redemption value each period is determined the same way. The following is a table of
which the probability of getting a value in a certain range is listed: (It is for your reference) 
Range of Redemption value 
0-49 
0-99 
0- 149 
0- 1 99 
0-249 
0-299 
0-349 
0-399 
0-449 
0-499 
0-549 
0-599 
0-649 
0-699 
0-749 
0-799 
0-849 
0-899 
0-949 
0-999 
Probability of a value in this range 
8% 
16% 
24% 
32% 
40% 
48% 
56% 
64% 
72% 
80% 
82% 
84% 
86% 
88% 
90% 
92% 
94% 
96% 
98% 
100% 
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To Prove: 
Proof: 
This implies 
Appendix B 
db(v;r,) I = N- 1dv ...... N-l+r 
b(O;r1) = 0
limb(O;r,)= 0..... 
since b(v;r) is a continuous function
r (!. - b) limu =lim ' 2 = oo "� I v-+0 V-b 
. 1. r, (I-b)Jim u2 = lITl oo v-+0 v-+0 V - b 
substitute into W2 and W3 we have
I}l1J W, = ll,n;i 2aG(u, )+2(1-a)[G(u,)-G(u,)] 
= 2a+ 2(1-a)(l-1) 
= 2a since limG(x)= I, ...  
lj,r;i.;i W, = lj,r;i.;i (2a-l)[G(u,)-G(uJ]+I-G(u,) 
= (2a - 1)(1-1)+ 1 -1 
=0 
put into equation (4) and let I� � =x, we have
(N - l )W, 
.r = -( --)--�--,,,-.:-,.­N -l + r W, 2ar + <·-•XN-i) 
(N -l)W, 
=
------
'--
-�,,...­,,,. ( N - l + r )W, -2ar + ( ,  ) \7°1 ( ... - 1 )
27 
since 
solving for x, we have 
therefore 
Jim.£. = db I v=() ,..,,, v dv 
N - 1x =  
N - l + r  
. db(v;r,) N - 1  hm = 
·�• dv N - l + r  
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QE. D. 
Appendix C 
To prove If b(v;r) is a solution to maxz(v-x)'{E,H(11(.x;r)) }"-1 
then b(ii,r)is a solution to maxz(ii -x)'{E,fi (11(.x;r))}"-1 
where for all a e 9\, � e :it• 
Let 
ii = a+ �v 
b(ii;r) = a +  �b(v;r) 
fi(a + �y) =  H(y) for ally e :it• 
Eu(x) = (v -x)' {E,H(11(x;r))},,_1 
Eii(x) = (ii-x)' {Erii(11(x;r))r-'
since b is solution to max, Eu(x) for fix v 
Eu(b) � Eu(x) for all xe9\ 
now 
Eu(t;) = (v - b)' {E)i(n(b;r ))}"_
,
= W (v - b)' {E)i(a + �it(b; r))r' since v -b = a + �v - (a + �b)= �(v - b) 
= W (v - b )' {E,H(it(b; r))}"_, and let it(b;r) = a +  �it(b;r) 
= � 'Eu(b) 
similarly Eii(a + �) = W Eu(x) for all xe 9\ ( ! )implies
W Eii(b) <= W Eii(a + �) 
2: � '  Eii(y) for all y 
=> Eu("b) 2: Eii(y) since � > 0
=> b is a solution to max Eu(x) 
I 
2 9  
(1)  
Table 1: Experimental Parameters 
No. of No. in F.ach  No. of T = Subject Fnnc/Do!W 
Experiment Subjeds Auction Periods a O!fm Pool• c..v.n;,,, Date ""' 
I 12 3 60 0.8 0 Caltech o.oi 1 1/6/88 
2 12 3 120 0.2 0 Caltech 0.01 1/30/89 
3 12 3 70 0.8 soo Caltech 0.01 S.Ul/89 
4 12 3 JOO 0.2 soo Caltech 0.01 S.u2/89 
s 12 3 100 0.8 0 PCC 0.01 S.U3/89 
6 1 2  3 100 0.8 soo PCC,Cahed> 0.01 S.US/89 
*The subjects are either Caltech or PCC (Pasadena City College) students. 
3 0  
Table 2A: Maximum Log Likelihood Statistics 
Model Estimates 
LCRRAM 
L . MM 
LSIMAM 
LSOPAM 
Log Likelihood 
Ratio Estimates 
LR CRRAMMM 
LR CRRAM SlMAM LR= 
Log Likelihood 
Ratio Standard 
Deviation 
' A 
niWCRRAMMM 
' A 
n>WCRRAMSIMAM 
' A 
n>WCRRAMSOP AM 
Test Statistics 
CRR.AM vs. others 
LR CRRAMMM 
n±w cRRAMMM 
LR CRRAMSi MAM 
' A 
n>WCRRAMSJ MAM 
LR CRRAMSOP AM 
• ' A 
n>WCRRAMSOP AM 
Test Stabst1cs 
CR.RAM vs. others 
with correction 
• 
K. = � log(n) - � log{n) 
LR CRRAMSiMAM 
l A 
n 'WCRRAMSIMAM 
LRCRRAMSOP AM 
' A 
niWCRRAMSOP AM 
1 
-3392 
-3757 
-3641 
-3190 
365 
248 
-203 
26.5 
23.8 
32.5 
13.83 
10.43 
-6.16b 
12.23 
.3_72b 
Experiment 
2 3 4 5 
-7736 -4599 -6818 -6414 
-7780 -4979 -6880 -6428 
-7682 -4731 -6792 -6380 
-75 12 -4504 -6706 -6289 
44.2 380 62.3 13.9 
-54.0 132 -25.9 -34 
-224 -95.2 - 1 12 -125 
12.6 37.5 12.2 28.2 
16.6 20.7 13.6 25.0 
22.5 16.2 20.1 17.8 
3.493 10.13 5.083 0.494 
-3.26b 6.393 -1.91 b -1.37 
- I0.3b -5 .87b -5.56b -7.03b 
-0.63 8.343 - 1 .65 0.35 
-6.28b -0.86 -5.21 b -2.22b 
3 1  
6 pooled 
-6598 -35557 
-6982 -36806 
-6677 -35903 
-6516 -34717 
384 1 143 
79.0 345 
-81.6 -840.8 
38.4 27.0 
24.3 20.0 
14.6 20.7 
10.03 46.33 
3.243 17.33 
-5.58b -40.6b 
4.993 19.93 
0.24 -18.7b 
Table 2B: Maximum Log Likelihood Statistics 
Experiment 
. 
I 2 3 4 5 6 pooled 
Model Estimates 
LCRRAM -3392 .-7736 -4599 -6818 -6414 -6598 -35557 
LRNNE -5343 -8165 -6236 -7052 -8966 -8925 -44687 
LRASNE -3975 -7807 -5034 -6926 -6848 -7023 -37613 
Log likelihood of CR.RAM w/o -3254 -7390 -4563 -6717 -6383 -6542 -34849 
rationaJ expectation hypothesis 
LCRRAM w/o R.E.H. 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test Statistics 
2(LcRRAM - LRNNE ) 3902 858 3214 468 5 104 4654 18200 
2( LCRRAM -L RASNE ) 1 170 142 870 216 868 850 4 1 16 
1442 834 942 4 1 8  . 930 962 5228 
2(LcRRAMw/o R.E.H - LCRRAM ) 
p-valuc 
CRRAM vs. RNNE 1.00+ 1.00+ 1.00+ 1.00+ 1.oo+ 1 .00+ 1 .00+ 
CRRAM vs. RASNE 1.00+ 1.oo+ 1.00+ 1.oo+ 1.oo+ 1.00+ 1 .00+ 
ffiRAM w/o R.E.H. vs. CRRAM 1.00+ 1 .00+ 1 .00+ 1.00+ 1.00+ 1.00+ 1 .00+ 
a Denotes the CRRAM is a better model than the other. 
b Denotes the CRRAM is a worse model than the other. 
• Since the MM and the CRRAM have the same number of parameters, no correction is needed. 
Correction for other models are: for the SIMAM. q=24: for the SOP AM. q=36; for the CRRAM. p=l2. 
+ Indicates the model can be rejected at 5 percent significance. 
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Table 2C: Maximum Log Likelihood Statistics 
&periment 
l 2 3 4 
Model F.stimates 
LBFCllRAM -3254 -7390 -4563 -6717 
LMM -3757 -7780 -4979 -6881) 
LSIMAM -3641 -7682 -4731 -6792 
LsoPAM -3 1 90  -7512 -4504 -6706 
Log Likelihood 
Ratio Estimates 
l.R BPCRRAM 503 390 416 163 
MM l.RBFCRRAM 387 292 168 75 SIMAM l.R BFCRRAM -64 122 -59 -11 SOP AM 
Log Likelihood 
Ratio Standard 
Deviation 
' A 
n2WBFCRRAM 34.8 34.3 50.7 23.8 MM 
' A 
n'iWBFCRRAM 31.6 32.l 43.l 21.8 S/MAM 
' A 
n2WBFCRRAM 30.l 24.0 41.0 21.9 SOPAM 
Test Statistics 
CR.RAM vs. olhers 
LR BFCRRAM MM 14.52 l l .4a 8.21a 6.858 
' A 
nlWBFCRRAM MM 
LRBFCRRAMS/MAM 12.28 9.10" 3.9o' 3.448 
' A 
n2WBFCRRAM S/MAM 
LRBFCRRAMSOP AM -2.13b !i.088 - 1 .44 -0.50 
' A "iWBFCRRAM n SOPAM 
8 Denotes the CRRAM is a better model than the other. 
b Denotes the CRRAM is a worse model than the other.
3 3  
5 6 
-6383 -6542 
-6428 -6982 
-6381) -6677 
-6289 -6516 
45 440 
3 135 
-94 -26 
82.5 76.4 
81.2 67.8 
78.3 63.3 
0.55 S.768 
0.04 1.994 
- 1.20 -0.41 
-lod 
-34849 
-36806 
-35903 
-34717 
1957 
1054 
-132 
S6.0 
51.9 
48.7 
34.98 
20.38 
-2.71" 
Table 3: Pseudo R2
Experiment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
CRRAM 
Mean of 0.97 0.90 
Pseudo R2 
0.83 0.89 0.91 0.96 
Standard deviation 0.02 0.10 
of Pseudo R2 
0.02 0.05 0.09 0.12 
MM 
Mean of 
Pseudo R2 
0.92 0.91 0.66 0.89 0.90 0.74 
Standard deviation 
of Pseudo R2 
0.05 0.09 0.24 0.05 0.08 0.22 
SIMAM 
Mean of 
Pseudo R2 
0.94 0.92 0.80 0.90 0.91 0.85 
Standard deviation 
of Pseudo R2 
0.08 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.1 1
SOPAM 
Mean of 0.97 0.93 
Pseudo R2 
0.84 0.91 0.92 0.87 
Standard deviation 
of Pseudo R1 
0.02 0.07 0.21 0.05 0.07 0.1 1  
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Table 4: Estimation of Risk Aversion Parameter (r) 
Experiment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mean of r 0.476 0.528 0.713 0.654 0.350 0.423 
Standard deviation of r 0.187 0.119 0.596 0.291 0.182 0.251 
Only the means and standard deviation across subjects are reponed. 
3 5  
Ex--riment 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Table 5: Kolomogorov-Smimov (K-S) Test Statistics
of Risk Parameter (r) Estimates 
Experiment 
1 2 3 4 5 
K-SS!als - 0.17 0.25 0.42 0.50 
p-value 1 .00* 0.85* 025* 0.10* 
K.S Stats 0.17 - 0.25 0.33 0.58 
p-value 1.00* 0.85* 0.52* 0.03 
K-S Stats 0.25 0.25 - 0.33 0.58 
p-va1ue 0.85* 0.8<* - 0.52* 0.03 
" --'· 
K-S Stals 0.42 O.oc 0.33 - 0.58 
p.value 0.25* 0.52* 0.52* 0_03 
K-S Stals 0.50 0.58 0.58 0.58 . 
p-value 0.10* 0.03 0.03 0.03 
K-S Stals 0.42 0.50 0.42 0.50 0.33 
p-value 0.25* 0.10* 0.25* 0.10* 0.52* 
K-S Statistics n-value 
All experiments vs. Jog-normal distribution 0.14 0.13+ 
6 
0.42 
0.25* 
0.50 
0.10* 
0.42 
0.25* 
0.50 
0.10* 
0.33 
0.52* 
-
• Indicates failure to reject the hypothesis that the risk parameters estimates are drawn from the same 
distribution in both experiments at 5 percent significance. 
+ Indicates failure to reject the hypothesis that the risk parameters estimates are drawn from a log­
normal distribution at 5 percent significance. 
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Figure 1 MM and SIMAM 
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Figure 2 Sophisticated Ad hoc Model CSOPAM) 
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Figure 3A 
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Figure 3B 
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Figure 4A CF.RAM with a-o . e , E ( r) •0 . 7  sr2-0 : 1  
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Figure 4B CRRAM with a•0 . 8 ,  r-0 . 7  sr2•0 . l  
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Figure 4F CRRAM with 11•0 .2, r-0 . 7, E (r) -0 ;7 
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Figure 6A Estimat:bn Of Bidding Function (Exp 3 Subject 4 )  
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Figure 6B Estimat:i:>n Of Bidding Function (Exp 5 Subject 4 )  
2 0 0  4 0 0  6 0 0  B O O  1 0 0 0  
value 
49 
Figure 6C Estimat::t>n Of Bidding Function (Exp 1 Subject 9 )  
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Figure Go Estirnat:i;Jn Of Bidding Function (Exp 2 Subject 9 )  
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Figure GE Estimatbn Of Bidding Function (ExP 3 Subject 3 )  
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Figure 6F Estimatbn Of Bidding Function (Exp 4 Subject 4 )
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Figure 6G Estimat;k>n Of Bidding Function (Exp 5 Subject 7 )
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